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Nesbitt: The Proposed Rules for Changes in Federal Practice

THE PROPOSED RULES FOR CHANGES IN FEDERAL
PRACTICEO
Frank W. Nesbitt"
VII. SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
Provision is made in Rules 42 and 43 for summary judgments.
Rule 42 provides for summary judgment in advance of trial
upon the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file with respect
to any of the matters involved in the action, Such a judgment
may be entered on motion. The adverse party may file affidavits
in opposition, and the court may permit either party to take and
file depositions or to present oral testimony. If the court find that
there is no substantial issue of fact affecting the right of the
moving party to judgment, and that he is entitled to a judgment,
it shall give judgment accordingly.
With respect to Rule 43, I wonder if it would stand up against
an assertion that it violates the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. This rule provides that any party
seeking to recover upon a claim, counter-claim or cross claim, may,
at any time after serving ti pleading presenting the claim, move
for a summary judgment in his favor thereon. Such judgment
under the rule shall forthwith be rendered if the motion be supported by affidavits setting forth facts which, on their face, would
require a decision in his favor as a matter of law, unless the adverse party shall present opposing affidavits setting forth substantial evidence in denial or in avoidance thereof. Please note that
these opposing affidavits are not sufficient if they merely assert
that the affiant fairly believes that the party on whose behalf the
affidavit is made, has a good defense as to all or part of the claim.
These affidavits, in order to be sufficient, must set forth "substantial evidence" by affidavit to sustain his side of the issue.
The rule goes even further, and provides in its second paragraph that a defendant, at any time after serving on the plaintiff
his pleading presenting his defense, may move for a summary
judgment as to all or any part of the claim against him. The rule
requires that the judgment be forthwith rendered, if the motion
be supported by affidavits setting forth facts (which of course
Continued from the December, 1936, issue.
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means evidence) which, on their face, would require a decision in
his favor as a matter of law, unless the adverse party shall present opposing affidavits setting forth "substantial evidence" in denial or avoidance thereof. Here is a provision for a trial in advance of a trial, and without a jury in any case. Is it constitutional? If so, is it wise? Is it fair? Is it fair to the litigants? Is
it fair to our already over-burdened district judges?
Rule 44 is an interesting sequence to Rule 43. It provides
that if the court, on examining the pleadings and the evidence and
"by interrogating counsel", find that a judgment on the whole
case cannot be rendered under the motion just referred to, it shall
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy,
and what material facts are actually controverted. It then becomes
the duty of the court to make an order specifying the facts that
appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to
which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy,
and directing such further proceedings in the action as may be
just. Upon the trial of the action (and of course this means the
second trial, the formal trial, the jury trial in a jury case), the
facts so specified shall be deemzed established and the trial shall be
conducted accardingly, unless the court, for good cause shown, sets
aside its previous order. This rule may work in Detroit where it
has been employed for some years, or in Boston where it has been
recently adopted, but, if constitutional, will it work in West Virginia, where our district judges are required to travel all over their
districts and hold their courts at various locations long distances
apart?
VIII. TRIALS
The committee, after providing for the above-mentioned summary judgments, at the outset of the branch of its proposed rules
relating to the subject of trials, assures us, at the head of Rule 45,
that "The right of trial by jury as at common law, and declared
by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, shall be preserved
to the parties inviolate". The committeE then goes on in that rule
to provide that, unless a party at or before twenty days after the
service of the last pleading, or at such earlier time as the court may
order, demand a jury trial, he shall be deemed to have waived it.
One party may demand a jury trial of certain specified issues. It is then up to the other party, within ten days or such
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earlier time as the court may fix, to demand a jury trial of all or
any of the other issues.
When certain of the issues are to be tried by jur and others
by the court, the court may determine the sequence in which such
issues shall be tried.
Consolidationand severance. Rule 49 gives to the court almost
unlimited power with respect to consolidation and severance. A
joint hearing or trial of any or all of the matters in issue may be
directed where there are actions of a like nature or involving a
common question of law pending before the tourt. This is true
notwithstanding the parties may be wholly different. The court
may also sever claims joined in a single action, and require that
they be proceeded with in separate actions.
Juries. Rule 53 provides for! one or two extra jurors to sit as
alternates in the court's discretion. These alternates shall be selected and shall have the same functions as the principal jurors, except
that they shall not take part in the deliberations of the jury or in
the rendition of the verdict, unless called upon to replace a principal juror.
Rule 54 gives to the parties the right to stipulate for a jury
of less than twelve, or for a verdict by a stated majority of the
jury.
IX. Mo'roN FOR DIRECTED VERDICT -

JUDGMENT

Non Obstante

Rule 56, with respect to motions for directed verdicts and the
effect thereof, is interesting and is an inviting subject for discussion. The first paragraph involves what I believe to be a welcome
change from the present rule in the federal courts. It provides that
in any action tried by a jury, a motion for a directed verdict at
the close of the evidence offered by an opponent, shall not operate
as a waiver of the right on the part of the movant to offer evidence
in the event that the motion is not granted, and that such a motion, which is not granted, shall not be held to constitute a waiver
of trial by jury, even though all parties to tkq action have moved
for directed verdicts.
It is the second paragraph of the rule which raises a series of
controversial questions. That paragraph reads as follows:
"Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close
of all the evidence is not granted, the court shall be deemed
to have reserved decision thereon and to have taken the verdict
subject to a later determination of the questions involved.
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After the jury has been discharged the court shall proceed to
make such determination of the motion as the ends of justice
shall require. If no verdict has been returned, the court may
order judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed,
or may order a new trial; if a verdict has been returned it
may order judgment upon the verdict or judgment as if the
requested verdict had been directed, or a new trial."
It will be observed that the rule makes no provisions for an
alternative verdict such as we -have in our practice with respect
to demurrers to the evidence. It provides for only two circumstances with respect to the action of the jury: First, if there be
no verdict at all, and second, if there be a verdict. In either of
those events, the rule would authorize the court to enter judgment
in favor of the movant, if the court believe the law to bd with the
movant. In the first instance non obstante no verdict at all, and in
the second instance non obstante the verdict rendered.
Evidently recognizing a very serious doubt as to the constitutionality of a rule which would give to the court in a jury case the
power to render a judgment upon the evidence without the support of a jury finding, the committee has proposed an alternative
to the above-mentioned rule, by adding at the end of it the following paragraph:
"Provided that, in actions where there is a right to a
trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, the court shall not, without the consent of the jury, reserve the question of the sufficiency of evidence to support a
verdict in favor of any party who shall object to such reservation."
With respect to this proposed rule and the alternative paragraph added thereto, the committee expresses itself in part as follows:
"The Committee concluded, first, that if the trial court
reserved decision on the question of law, with the consent of
the parties, express or implied, then it or the upper court on
appeal could grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We
also concluded that there is old common law authority prior
to the adoption of our Constitution for the proposition that
even if the parties do not consent, the, court may reserve the
question of law with the consent of the jury. If these conclusions are right, the rule may provide for judgment notwithstanding the verdict if the parties consent to the court reserving decision on the question, and even if the parties object, the
same result wil follow if the jury expressly consents. If it
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were the law prior to the adoption of the Constitution that the
question of law could be reserved with the consent of the jury,
then a rule to that effect preserves the right of trial by jury as
the Constitution requires. Rule 56 is drawn along these lines.
It will be noted that it provides that the Court shall be deemed
to have reserved decision unless the parties object, and it also
provides, under the alternative addition, that even if a party
,objects the court may do so if the jury consents."

Is the committee right, or is it wrong? Is there real common
law authority prior to the adoption of our Constitution for the
proposition that even if the parties do not consent, the court may
reserve the question of law and render a judgment non obstante
with the consent of the jury? Even if there be such authority, was
it, or was it not, nullified in America by the adoption of the Seventh
Amendment providing that "the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved"? Preserved to whom-to the jury? Hardly. Pre.
served to the parties. In the adoption of that Amendment, was it
contemplated that the right preserved to the parties might be
waived by the jury? That is a question fit for discussion.
X.

JUDGMENTS

The proposed rules contain some interesting provisions with
respect to judgments. Some of these provisions are novel to say
the least, from the point of view of the practitioner in the Virginias.
For instance, a judgment or final order may be entered by the
court upon any issue or issues determined in favor of or against
any party or parties at any stage of an action, and the action may
proceed as to the remaining issues or parties as justice may require, and a judgment or order entered pursuant to this rule shall
be final for all purposes, including the right to appeal therefrom
(Rule 63). It is possible to imagine a series of final judgments in
a single action, and appeals from them following each other like
bullets from a machine gun. Rule 68 contains an interesting provision which may furnish our district judges with occupation
during their leisure hours. This rule requires that in all actions
tried without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions of law thereon. This includes law
actions, of course; and in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions, the court shall similarly set forth its findings of facts
and conclusions of law which constitute the ground of its action.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1937

5

WestVIRGINIA
Virginia LawLAW
Review,
Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1937], Art. 3
WEST
QUARTERLY
XI.

REGISTRATION OF JUDGMENTS WITH OTHER DISTRICT
CouRTs or THE UNITED STATES

Rule 85 provides for the registration of judgments in district
courts of the United States other than the district in which the
judgment was rendered. This feature of the proposed rules makes
provision for something that has been advocated by the American
Bar Association for quite a number of years. The rule is proposed
in the alternative. I shall refer to the second alternative first.
This provision is as follows:
"A judgment or final order rendered by any district court
may be registered in any other district court, and when so
registered, for the purpose of enforcement or utilization
thereof, shall have the same effect and like proceedings may
be taken thereon as if the judgment or order had been originally entered by the court in which such registration is had.
"The clerk of the court in which a judgment or final
order has been entered must furnish to any person applying
therefor and paying the costs thereof, one or more authenticated copies of the judgment or final order for registration,
attested by the clerk and under the seal of the court. Registration of the judgment or final order is perfected by the
filing of such copy of the judgment with the court where registration is sought."
The other alternative is perhaps too long to be incorporated
in this paper. It limits the right to register to a final order or
judgment requiring that money be paid, or that any action shall
or shall not be done, or establishing a status, or investing a person
with authority over property. It requires an application to the
clerk designating the court in which it is proposed to make the
registration. Under this alternative the clerk is required to recite
in his certificate that the copy of the order or judgment is issued
for registration in that designated court, and there must be a certificate of the judge that the attestation is in due form. This alternative also provides that only one such copy may be issued on a
single application, but that there may be separate applications for
as many copies as may be needed, eaclh copy designating the court
in which it is to be registered. Under this alternative, the registered order or judgment cannot be enforced until some person
having personal knowledge shall show to the judge: (1) that no
stay of execution or supersedeas, bond or injunction pending an
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appeal is in force in the court which originally rendered the order
or judgment; (2) that the original order or judgment has not been
set aside, vacated or reversed and has not been modified, except as
specifically stated in such affidavit; and (3) that the prevailing
party is entitled to have the order or judgment enforced by the
court wherein it was originally entered to the extent specified in
the affidavit. This alternative Rule 85 further provides that the
clerk of the originating court must certify to each of the courts in
which registration has been had, the record of any satisfaction or
part satisfaction or of any order setting aside, vacating, reversing
or modifying the order or judgment.
It likewise becomes the duty of the clerk of any court in which
registration has been had, to certify such of the foregoing records
as may be filed in his court, to the court in which the original order
or judgment was rendered. This alternative penalizes any person
who shall bring an action on an order or judgment when registration pursuant to this rule would accord him the same relief. The
penalty is that costs shall be denied him. Under these provisions
the party against whom the judgment was entered may at any time
move to vacate the registration on the ground that the statute of
limitations of the forum would bar an action on the judgment, or
that the judgment has been set aside, vacated or reversed. He may
also move to modify the registration in the respect and to the extent to which the original judgment has been modified.

XII.

APPEALS

Rule 72 abolishes petitions for appeal to the circuit court of
appeals, and provides that an appeal may be had by serving a notice of appeal and filing it with the district court. This rule and
Rule 74, regarding the making up of the record on appeal, and
particularly the requirement that the judge examine and certify
the record, are very strenuously opposed by Mr. Claude M. Dean,
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Appeals of this circuit. He delivered
an address at Asheville opposing these proposed changes, and has
published a pamphlet giving the reasons for his opposition. Those
principal reasons seem to be: first, that the committee is overstepping its functions in proceeding to deal with the subject of
appeals and records on appeal, in view of the fact that the legislation under which the work is being done limits the scope of the
work to rules for practice and procedure in the district courts and
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in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia; second, that the
prescribing of a separate method of appeal from the district courts
to the circuit courts of appeals merely brings confusion in view of
the existing rules with respect to direct appeals to the Supreme
Court of the United States; third, that the method proposed by the
committee in Rule 74 necessarily involves a largely increased
amount of labor for the district judges in the matter of making up
the record.
The committee offers as an alternative Rule 74, a proposal
abolishing the printing of the record on appeal, and the substitution of an original typewritten record with three typewritten
copies furnished to the judges of the circuit court of appeals. This
alternative provides that the appellate court may by standing rule
require that the printed briefs of the parties shall reproduce those
portions of the record which may be necessary to the understanding of the respective assignments of error. This alternative is also
opposed by Mr. Dean in his pamphlet. The committee says, however, that the great majority of the states do not require printed
records on appeal, but allow the alternative use of typewritten
copies. They say that only eleven states are found which definitely
require printed records. The committee suggests that the record
on appeal serve merely for reference or amplification of individual
points, and that the case be heard on the printed briefs submitted
and on the abstracts therein contained.
Rules 74 and 75 contain some provisions which, I believe, will
be welcome to all of us. Those provisions abolish the requirement
that the testimony of witnesses shall be reduced to narrative form
in making up the record on appeal. The committee states that while
the old system has a tendency perhaps to reduce the length of
records and save something in printing, those advantages are more
than outweighed by preparing the narrative form, and by the
heavy burden and expense on litigants and lawyers in preparing
and settling and agreeing upon narrative statements. The committee believes (and I believe) that the bar generally will approve the
abolishment of the requirement for the narrative form.
An interesting question is raised by the committee in connection with its proposed Rule 68 with respect to the effect which
should be given to the findings of a trial court in a jury-waived
case. At present in equity cases, the appellate court has quite broad
authority to review the evidence, and pass on the weight of evi-

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol43/iss2/3

8

118

Nesbitt: The Proposed Rules for Changes in Federal Practice
PROPOSED RULES IN FEDERAL PRACTICE

dence. On the other hand, in law cases by statute the findings of a
court in a jury-waived case are given the same effect as the verdict
of a jury, to-wit, conclusive as to controverted facts. Three alternatives are open: first, to retain the present system; second,
to provide uniformity between law and equity cases by giving the
findings in equity cases, as well as in jury-waived cases, the effect
of a verdict; or, third, adopting uniformity by enlarging the power
of the reviewing court over findings in a jury-waived case, by
making it correspond to the existing authority in review of equity
findings.
The committee seems to favor the third alternative, in view
of the fact that it will bring uniformity as between equity cases
and law cases which have been passed on by the judge of the trial
court without the intervention of a jury, and at the same time, will
not limit or restrain the power of the appellate court with respect
to reviews in equity. The committee opposes the continuation of
the present system which creates an artificial difference as between
judge-decided cases which happen to be at law, and those which
happen to be in equity. The continuation of that system, if we are
to have the one form of procedure governing both law and equity,
would, in many cases, require the appellate court to spell out which
questions are legal and which questions are equitable before determining the scope of the appellate court's powers with respect
to those questions.
At the Conference at Asheville, there was some difference of
opinion between many of the district judges on the one hand, and
some of the circuit judges on the other hand. Those district judges
advocated a rule which would forbid the reviewing court from reviewing controverted questions of fact which had been passed on
by the trial court. On the other hand, the appellate judges seemed
to favor the rule preferred by the committee, to-wit, that in law
cases tried without a jury, as well as in equity cases, the appellate
court have the power to review controverted questions of fact.

XIII.

REMOVALS

Naturally the question will arise in the minds of many of the
members of the bar as to what application these rules of procedure
and practice are to have to cases removed from our state courts.
That subject is covered by Rule 90, sub-division (d), as follows:
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"These Rules shall apply to civil actions removed to the
District Court of the United States from the State Courts, and
shall govern all procedure after removal, and a repleading
shall not be ordered unless the Court deems it advisable. In
an action, removed from the Court of a State, in which the
defendant has not answered, he must answer or present his
other defenses or objections available to him under these rules
within the time fixed by the law of the State, or within five
days after the filing of the transcript of the record in the District Court of the United States, whichever period may be
longer. In a removed action in which all necessary pleadings have been filed at the time of removal, a party who has
not already waived his right thereto shall be entitled to jury
trial under the circumstances and in the manner provided in
Rules 45 and 46 if claim therefor is served and filed within
ten days after the record of the action is filed in the District
Court of the United States."
CONCLUSION

Such are the new rules. Such is the New Deal in pleading and
practice and procedure in our federal courts. Code pleading glorified. We of the Virginias and of Maryland are about all that are
left in defense of our common-law Alcazar. Our turn to surrender
has come. The glories of our past are but tales to be told. A new
banner waves over our fortress. The revolution is here. On the
first of September of next year, the conquerors plan to take charge.
Sic transit gloria mundi.
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